by Dr. Robert Zuber, Global Action to Prevent War
In
response to the Chair's new paper on the preamble and principles distributed on
Tuesday in Main Committee I, delegations were still largely making statements
about 'what they want' and 'what they won't accept' rather than 'what they can
live with' with a view towards a consensus treaty with only 8 scheduled days of
negotiating sessions remaining.
We do
not make the assumption that the parts of the Chair's new paper that have so
far avoided direct criticism are therefore completely acceptable to all delegations.
Many delegates have reserved the right to 'return to the text' to suggest
future changes more often than they have affirmed existing language. We still
have a ways to go to reach consensus and delegations will need to soften their
positions a bit more in order to get there.
Calling
for more 'softness' on positions does not imply disrespect of objections
raised. Indeed, in the writings from Global Action to Prevent War and some other
civil society organizations over these weeks, we have expressed our
understanding that a weak treaty focused only on exporting states with little
independent structure and only token review processes is likely to raise
legitimate skepticism by smaller importing states, especially states that are currently
experiencing internal conflict or are at political 'loggerheads' with the major
producing states.
This
skepticism has taken many forms in the ATT conference room, but one form is the
insistence by some delegations on the UN Charter principle of 'non-interference'
in states’ internal affairs. Our own reflection is that one of the reasons governments
seek to participate in the United Nations is to 'portion out' sovereignty and
suspend some of their trust issues for the sake of norms, resolutions, and treaties
that allow states to use the collective will and resources of the international
community to enhance their own security and development options. In essence, governments
'use' their UN membership to obtain resources or other assistance through
collaborative engagement that they could not possibly acquire left solely to
their own devices. Some 'portion out' more liberally than others, some trust
processes like the ATT more than others, but all benefit in one way or another
from engaging the UN’s many agencies and structures.
As
readers may know, some governments vigorously claim principles of
non-interference within the context of debates on the norm of the “Responsibility
to Protect,” which seeks to protect citizens when their own governments cannot
or will not protect them. Of course, there are many forms of 'interference'
other than those involving the most coercive response options, but often when governments
invoke this formula they have in mind responses that will have the most severe implications
for national sovereignty and security. This also seems to be true in cases
where ‘non-interference’ is invoked by delegations in the ATT context.
Thoughtless,
reckless, or politically motivated interference is a grave concern for many
states and we believe that this concern is generally appropriate. Successful
and sustainable interference, on the other hand, requires skill, fairness, and
restraint. Even relatively benign 'interferences,' such as trying to stop a
family feud, require careful, even-handed listening and restrained responses.
While some governments might seem guilty of an oversimplification on
interference, we should keep in mind that all treaty negotiations tend to
stretch boundaries of trust, and negotiations on weapons transfers are widely
assumed to have particularly high consequences for states. If we get this very
wrong, and we must not, we will spend the next few years cleaning up logistical
and political messes rather than focusing together on eliminating poorly
regulated and diverted arms transfers.
We at
Global Action have our own concerns about some of the ways in which this treaty
is taking shape as well as concern about the intensity of some of the
objections put forth by diplomats. That said, we have noted a softening of the
tone in the room, even if not yet accompanied by sufficient nuance in the
formulation of objections. We urge even more softness as the days progress on
issues such as non-interference. Indeed, we urge a greater willingness by
states to nuance and contextualize all of their positions over these next few
days—even to share more about the things they can 'live with'—so that we can
spend less energy avoiding interference and more energy 'running interference'
for a successful treaty process.
