by Dr. Robert Zuber, Global Action to Prevent War
One of the significant concerns of Global
Action to Prevent War (GAPW), as well as of many other NGOs and delegations, is
the desire by some states for a treaty with numerous 'escape clauses' by which
governments can claim national interest as a rationale for suspending otherwise
binding criteria that sanction—or deny—arms transfers.
It has often been said that you craft
treaties not for your friends but for the skeptics. And generally what skeptics
require is assurances that obligations and benefits are spread evenly, that (in
the case of an ATT) a treaty does not inadvertently reinforce advantages for
arms producing states beyond those they already enjoy in a robust arms market
that literally defies the global economic slowdown that has affected virtually
every other industry.
Skeptics (and some NGOs echo this particular
concern) also seek assurances that textual loopholes have been thought through
carefully and then closed to the greatest extent possible.
This often proves to be a harder task than it
might seem. Often, loopholes do not become apparent until vigorous
implementation ensues. Even with the experience in the negotiating room and
even assuming good faith efforts to comply fully with treaty obligations,
loopholes appear at the strangest times and in unforeseen ways. Part of why
GAPW advocates for robust review conferences and other oversight mechanisms is
to highlight and address these loopholes once they are recognized as such.
In this context, it is important to note that
treaties generally have two basic sorts of loopholes—those related to the text
of the statute itself and those related to the implementation of treaty
provisions. Again, the reason that GAPW has advocated for a strong implementation
support unit (ISU) and other, complementary mechanisms is because we recognize
that the temptations will be great—regardless of the strength of approved
treaty text—to sacrifice compliance to national interest.
It is important that approved text be as free
of 'escape routes' as possible. But even a 'tight' treaty without sufficient
enforcement and oversight is likely to create a structure of obligations with
many loopholes—some of which we can predict but others of which we haven't yet
foreseen.
We are most of the way through July and many
issues remain before consensus can be assured. We hope that some of that
consensus relates to the need to close loopholes within the statute and assure
a process to stay one step ahead of the 'escape routes' that are almost certain
to appear at a later stage.
