by Dr. Robert Zuber, Global Action to Prevent War
My original intention today was to prepare an essay on 'curbing our enthusiasm' regarding the introduction of proposals that create new structures or introduce language that is not consistent with these negotiations or with established practice in other treaty bodies or international legal obligations. There are several ways to undermine a treaty, only one of which involves a direct assault on the treaty itself. The others involve an assault on consensus through the introduction of concepts, structural recommendations, or placement of treaty elements that jeopardize consensus and timely progress. But we had a change of focus early on Thursday.
The first paper from the Chair of Main Committee
I represented a major challenge to treaty coherence. GAPW has previously highlighted
the folly of moving criteria into the implementation section – a position
suggested primarily (though not exclusively) by the P5. In the absence of
criteria that stand as a corrective to narrow or self-interested state interpretations,
we are left with states possessing many fluid options but few binding
obligations. Criteria as a function of implementation represents nothing more
than guidelines – like replacing the Ten Commandments with the Ten Suggestions.
We need neither commandments nor suggestions but legally actionable risk
criteria that directly impact the decision making of major producing and
importing states alike.
My original intention today was to prepare an essay on 'curbing our enthusiasm' regarding the introduction of proposals that create new structures or introduce language that is not consistent with these negotiations or with established practice in other treaty bodies or international legal obligations. There are several ways to undermine a treaty, only one of which involves a direct assault on the treaty itself. The others involve an assault on consensus through the introduction of concepts, structural recommendations, or placement of treaty elements that jeopardize consensus and timely progress. But we had a change of focus early on Thursday.
Criteria placed in proposed treaty text as a
subset of implementation is not properly criteria at all and is not in keeping
with the customary understanding pertinent to other treaty obligations. As we
have mentioned often, an ATT must do its part to end diversion of transfers but
must not set a dangerous precedent in the UN system for creating treaties that
have, in practice, little more force than 'non-papers'. Fortunately, the paper presented by the
Chair later in the day represents, in our view, a much more competent
understanding of the role of criteria in a treaty. We strongly urge that this formulation carry
the day.
