by Katherine Prizeman, Global Action to Prevent War
During Thursday morning’s Main Committee
I meeting on criteria and parameters, several delegations referred to the paper
co-sponsored by Australia, Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland, “Proposal on Criteria
for Exports,” as a good basis for discussions on the formulation of this
section of the treaty. The paper does indeed provide helpful guidance on
criteria that should be included in the ATT. Most importantly, the paper
improves greatly on the President’s 3 July 2012 paper insofar as the phrase
“shall assess whether” is replaced with the phrase “shall not authorize … where
substantial risk exists.” As has been suggested by many civil society
colleagues and delegates alike, the provision “shall assess” is simply not
sufficient; it is essential that some level of accountability exists beyond
requiring states to conduct entirely private “assessments”.
Nonetheless, while the paper provides
constructive language on many of the critical criterion for a robust
ATT—international humanitarian law and human rights, organized crime,
terrorism, development and poverty reduction, as well as diversion in all its
forms including corrupt practices—there is an area in which the paper could be
improved upon.
As explained in the “Introduction”
section, the paper adopts an “export-only” perspective, whereby the criteria
laid forth would be used by exporting states to determine whether or not to
authorize a transfer of arms. While exporting states will have the primary responsibility
to conduct consistent, robust, and rigorous assessments based on solid criteria
of decisions to export arms from their territory, the ramifications of facilitating
an “exporter-only” treaty could be detrimental to other states’ interests and,
therefore, the success of the treaty. Several delegations, including Egypt,
Cuba, and Syria, have already expressed that any treaty that represents an
imbalance between exporter and importer states will be unacceptable due to the
potential manipulation and political misuse of the criteria. It would follow
then, that a criteria section drafted entirely from the perspective of
exporters, detailing how such states are to determine arms transfers without
codifying the roles and responsibilities of importer and transit states, may
endanger the support of many non-exporting states for the ATT.
Additionally, such a one-sided
construction does not adequately underscore the responsibility that must be
borne by all states parties in the international arms trade. The explanatory
note at the conclusion of the paper reflects this concern by noting that,
“Commensurate with their role in the transfer chain, these [non-exporting] States
should be required to take all appropriate legal, administrative and other
measures necessary for ensuring the effectiveness of the Treaty.” Nonetheless,
the paper still leaves room for a hostile interpretation of criteria given that
non-exporting and non-manufacturing states may feel threatened by its “export
exclusivity”. For instance, the delegate of Venezuela, while not specifically
responding to the paper, stated on Thursday morning that a treaty that
represents another “tool for the club of exporting states” is unacceptable. It
is important to bear in mind the sensitivity around this issue and to
practically address the widespread aversion to using treaty criteria to
reinforce an exclusive “exporters club”.
While the majority of
assessments for authorization would be the responsibility of exporters, it is
unnecessary to limit the criteria to exporters, but rather, allow for the same
criteria to apply to the decisions of importer and transit states. It is
important to codify in the ATT the responsibilities of all states to contribute to ensuring international peace and
security through preventing the illicit and irresponsible trade in conventional
arms.
